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Long-run Economic Loss:
Conflicting Interests of
Class Members
Blankenship v. Omaha Public Power District,
195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to maintain a class action in either the state or federal
court system the representative party must fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the other class members.' It is axiomatic
that a representative cannot adequately protect the interests of the
class if his interests are antagonistic to or in conflict with those of
the class he purports to represent. 2 The Nebraska Supreme Court
in considering the issue of adequacy of representation has applied
an economic standard to determine when there is a conflict of
interest within a class.3 In Blankenship v. Omaha Public Power
District4 the court held that if any party in the class stands to suffer
a long-run economic loss as a result of his inclusion in the class, the
representative party will have a conflict of interest with the other
class members.5 This note will examine the court's authority and
1. A general rule for all class actions is that the named plaintiff must
adequately represent the unnamed class members. See Starrs, The
Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49
B.U.L. REV. 407, 496 (1969) (a comprehensive examination of pro-
cedural problems in state class actions).
2. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1768 (1972). Cases
holding that a representative party cannot have interests antagonistic
to the members of the class are: Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co.,
144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944); Molina v.
Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385 (D. Neb. 1947). See also note
35 infra.
3. Blankenship v. Omaha Public Power District, 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d
86 (1976).
4. Id.
5. This holding was based on the court's interpretation of its earlier deci-
sion in Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 185 Neb. 464, 176 N.W.2d
679 (1970). In Evans the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf
of himself and all other ratepayers against Metropolitan Utilities Dis-
trict [hereinafter referred to as M.U.D.] to enjoin the making of pay-
ments to the City of Omaha under NEB. REv. STAT. § 14-1401 (Reissue
1974). Plaintiffs also sought to recover from the City of Omaha all the
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rationale for imposing this economic standard and will discuss the
standard's future viability.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Robert Blankenship, a customer of Omaha Public Power Dis-
trict, brought a class action alleging that the "late payment
charges" imposed by the Omaha Public Power District were usu-
rious.6 He alleged two causes of action. In the first cause he
sought an accounting and refund on behalf of all those ratepayers
of defendant who, in the past five years, had paid the late charges
or forfeited discounts.7 In the second cause of action he sought an
injunction against future imposition of such late charges on behalf
of all those customers who would be forced to pay the allegedly
illegal charge.
The Omaha Public Power District moved for summary judg-
ment,8 alleging that the action could not be maintained as a class
money paid to it since 1947 under said statute by M.U.D. Some of the
ratepayers were within the taxing district of Omaha and others were
not. In striking down the class action because of a conflict of interest
the court stated:
Will all of the ratepayers of MUD from 1947 through 1966
be benefited by plaintiff's action if the plaintiff is successful
in securing a judgment of $4,445,850? It is obvious that the
city could pay such judgment only by the levy of a substan-
tial tax against the taxpayers of the city, many of whom
would also be MUD ratepayers. The record would indicate
that this would require a levy in excess of 5 mills. Plaintiff
has lived both inside and outside the city limits during the
period in question, but is at present a resident of the city.
Without question, ratepayers who are not taxpayers would
benefit if a recovery were made. This would include all the
ratepayers outside the city limits and those ratepayers within
the city who are not taxpayers. All other ratepayers, and
these would constitute the larger group, would undoubtedly
suffer a loss because they would be taxed for sufficient funds
to pay not only the judgment for the amount of the recovery
but also for the costs and expenses of the litigation. Their
interest cannot be said to be sufficiently identical with other
ratepayers to permit plaintiff to maintain this action on be-
half of all ratepayers.
Id. at 468, 176 N.W.2d at 681.
6. The merits of the plaintiff's case (whether the late payment charges
were in fact usurious) were never considered by the district court or
the Supreme Court.
7. The Omaha Public Power District established by affidavits that the
total of the "forfeited discounts" for the five years in question was
$2,409,397.31 or approximately $500,000.00 annually. It also showed
by affidavits that if it were required to make refunds of the forfeited
discounts and/or to discontinue this billing procedure new higher rates
would have to be charged. 195 Neb. at 172, 237 N.W.2d at 88.
8. Nebraska's Summary Judgment Act provisions are found in NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 25-1330 to 25-1336 (Reissue 1975).
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suit because there was a conflict of interest between the class
membersY The District Court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.")
The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the trial court's sum-
mary judgment, 1 using the following rationale. If the plaintiff
9. The Omaha Public Power District based its conflict of interest argu-
ment on the Nebraska Supreme Court decision of Evans v. Metropoli-
tan Utilities Dist., 185 Neb. 464, 176 N.W.2d 679 (1970). See note 5
supra. The plaintiff tried to distinguish Evans from the facts of this
case by pointing out that in Evans there were two distinct groups
within the class:
[A] group of allegedly wronged M.U.D. customers who would
bear no part of the financial burden of restoration of monies
if the suit were successful on the one hand, and, on the other,
a group of allegedly wronged M.U.D. customers who would
bear a substantial part of the burden if the suit were success-
ful. This latter group were taxpayers and, simultaneously,
customers.
Brief for Appellants at 11. The plaintiff argued that in the present
case there was no division of the class. If the plaintiff were successful,
all Omaha Public Power District ratepayers would bear proportionally
the financial burden for the past wrongful actions of the management
of the utility. This distinction, however, was not persuasive with the
court.
10. The trial judge concluded that:
If plaintiff were to succeed upon the first cause of action, it
would be required that defendant accumulate a fund in excess
of $2,000,000,000.00. Its only source would be its rate payers.
The result would be that, in some instances, members of the
successful class would be subjected to a rate increase (or de-
nied a rate decrease, as the case may be) which would, in
dollars or cents, exceed the amount of their recovery, even
ignoring the fact that the fund would itself be diminished on
account of attorney fees prior to its distribution.
The same result is reached in the second cause of action,
though with less clarity. Were plaintiff to succeed, defendant
would necessarily be required to modify its rates so as to
maintain the $500,000.00 plus annual income which would
otherwise be lost to it. Of the class, in this instance, including
all the rate payers, no doubt some would be financially
advantaged while some would financially disadvantaged over
any period of time.
195 Neb. at 176, 237 N.W.2d at 90.
11. The plaintiff raised the issue as to whether the right of a party to
sue as a representative of a class could be determined on a motion
for summary judgment. The court replied:
Plaintiff urges that a motion for summary judgment is not an
appropriate method for disposing of the issue of the plaintiff's
right to sue as representative of a class and that the trial court
erred in so doing. His position is that the remedy of summary
judgment is available only to determine whether or not there
is a factual issue upon which legal liability rests and that the
right to represent a class is not such an issue ....
If under the undisputed facts the right of a plaintiff to sue
as representative of a class is one of law, then there appears
to be no reason why that portion of the plaintiff's "claim"
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succeeded on the merits of the proposed class action, the Omaha
Public Power District would have to increase its rates. The reason
for the increase was twofold. First, to make the necessary refunds
required by the first cause of action; and second, to replace the
lost revenues from the enjoining of the imposition of future late
payment charges.12 These increased rates would be shared by all
ratepayers, including members of the class. 13  Because there were
some ratepayers within the class who paid the penalty only once or
rarely, they probably would be damaged economically in the long-
run by the increased rates.14  Therefore, the court concluded that
there was a potential conflict of interest between the representative
party and the other class members which precluded the mainte-
nance of the class action.'15
III. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES NO CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST
Most states have enacted class action statutes which fall into
one of three groups.'0 They are modeled after the 1848 Field
Code of New York, the 1938 Federal Rule, or the 1966 amended
Federal Rule.' 7 All three types of class action statutes require that
should not be determined under the provision of the statute
authorizing such judgment upon "all or any part thereof."
§ 25-1330, R.R.S.1943. No party cites any case directly on
point and we have found none. Defendant called to our atten-
tion Coffelt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 248 Ark. 313, 451
S.W. 2d 881, which involved a claim such as the one at issue
here and was decided upon summary judgment. However,
there was in that case no challenge on the class action aspect
of the suit. We hold that the right of a party to sue as repre-
sentative of a class may be raised by a motion for summary
judgment.
Id. at 173-74, 237 N.W.2d at 88-89.
12. Id. at 179, 237 N.W.2d at 91.
13. Id.
14. Id. The court in effect was weighing the recovery of each class mem-
ber against the potential cost of obtaining the recovery.
15. The court did reverse and remand the trial court's dismissal of the
suit to allow the plaintiff, Robert Blankenship, to proceed on a cause
of action individually.
16. See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLum.
L. REv. 609, 612 (1971) (an analysis of the current status of class ac-
tions in most state jurisdictions); Jaworski & Padgett, The Class Ac-
tion in Texas: An Examination and a Proposal, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1005
(1975). In addition to the three types of class action statutes men-
tioned, some jurisdictions recognize the common law class action. See
Starrs, supra note 1, at 425. See also Comment, Illinois: A Common
Law Approach, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1094 (1974).
17. For an individual analysis of each state's class action rule or statute
and corresponding case law see Starrs, supra note 1, at 433-94. See
also Homburger, supra note 16.
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there be no conflict of interest between the representative party
and the other class members.'
8
Nebraska's class action statute, modeled after the Field Code,19
provides:
When the question is one of a common or general interest of many
persons, or when the parties are very numerous, and it may be
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all.
20
The phrase "a common or general interest of many persons"
embodies the requirement that there be no conflict of interest
between the parties.21 This is illustrated by the Nebraska Supreme
Court decision of Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities District22 where
the court stated:
The general rule is that a plaintiff in a class action must have
an interest in the controversy common with those for whom he
sues and there must be that unity of interest between them that
the action might be brought by them jointly. Persons having an
interest adverse to those of parties purported to be represented can-
not maintain a representative or class suit on behalf of the latter.
2 .
The rationale behind the conflict of interest requirement is that
most jurisdictions, 24 including Nebraska, 25 give binding effect to
decrees in class action. Therefore, the absent members of the class
are bound by the results of the action. This binding effect of class
action decrees raises substantial due process questions. If the
18. See note 1 supra. For a discussion of the amended Federal Rule's
requirement that there be no conflict of interest see notes 53-56 and
accompanying text, infra.
19. See Mattis & Mitchell, The Trouble With Zahn: Progeny of Snyder
v. Harris Further Cripples Class Actions, 53 NEB. L. REV. 137, 170
(1974). See also Starrs, supra note 1, at 433.
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (Reissue 1975).
21. Starrs, supra note 1, at 501. This phrase, however, has created confu-
sion in the courts on another point. The question is whether "and"
should be substituted for "or" in the statute, thereby requiring both
a common or general interest and parties so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court. For a discussion
of this see Homburger, supra note 16, and Mattis & Mitchell, supra
note 19.
22. 185 Neb. 464, 176 N.W.2d 679 (1970). See note 5 for analysis of the
case supra.
23. Id. at 467, 176 N.W.2d at 681 (citations omitted).
24. For an examination of those jurisdictions giving binding effect to de-
crees see Starrs, supra note 1, at 442.
25. In Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 173 Neb. 428, 113 N.W.2d
617 (1962), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a class action will
have a binding effect on all members of the class. See also Gant
v. City of Lincoln, 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975).
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members are to be bound conclusively by the result of an action
prosecuted or defended by a party claiming to represent their
interests, basic notions of fairness and justice demand that they
receive adequate representation.
26
In most contexts, however, notice of the action is the touch-
stone that satisfies the due process requirements.2 7 The notice
should be sufficient to give the party an opportunity to appear and
to join in the lawsuit or to challenge the claims of representation.
It was this type of notice which the United States Supreme Court
required in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.28 The Nebraska su-
preme Court in Gant v. City of Lincoln,29 however, established a
more flexible standard for the due process requirement of notice in
class actions.30 The court in Gant determined that Eisen was
decided solely upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
26. See Wright & Miller, supra note 2, § 1765. The requirement that
members of a class receive adequate representation is illustrated by
the leading case of Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). In the course
of the opinion it was stated:
Because of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of
those who are putative parties to the agreement in compelling
or resisting its performance, it is impossible to say, solely be-
cause they are parties to it, that any two of them are of the
same class. Nor without more, and with the due regard for
the protection of the rights of absent parties which due pro-
cess exacts, can some be permitted to stand in judgment for
all.
It is one thing to say that some members of a class may
represent other members in a litigation where the sole and
common interest of the class in the litigation, is either to as-
sert a common right or to challenge an asserted obligation.
•... It is quite another to hold that all those who are free
alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them are
of a single class, so that any group merely because it is of
the class so constituted, may be deemed adequately to repre-
sent any others of the class in litigating their interests in
either alternative. Such a selection of representatives for pur-
poses of litigation, whose substantial interests are not neces-
sarily or even probably the same as those whom they are
deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent
parties which due process requires.
Id. at 44-46.
27. Wright & Miller, supra note 2, § 1765.
28. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In Eisen the United States Supreme Court re-
quired that individual notice be given to "all members of the class
who could be identified through reasonable effort."
29. 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975). In Gant the plaintiff brought
a class action on behalf of himself and all other Lincoln policemen
and firemen to recover money deducted from their pay for pension
purposes. The court determined that under § 25-319 individual notice
to class members need not be given.
30. Annual Survey of Nebraska Law, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 6 (1975) (a
concise discussion of the Gant decision).
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dure and that Eisen was not authority for the proposition that due
process requires individual notice to each class member.3 1 There-
fore, the court, relying on Nebraska's class action statute,32 held
that individual notice to class members was not required so long as
"the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the inter-
ests of absent parties who are to be bound by it.
''33
Thus, because individual notice of the class action is not re-
quired in Nebraska to comply with due process, the courts look
long and hard at the common interest requirement to see that no
conflict of interest exists. They are obligated to assure that the legal
rights of the absent parties are not jeopardized because of inade-
quate representation by the representative party. "3 4
IV. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE
COURT'S AUTHORITY AND RATIONALE
The concept that there can be no conflict of interest between
the representative party and the other members of the class is
supported unanimously by the courts.35  The crucial determina-
31. 193 Neb. at 112, 225 N.W.2d at 552.
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (Reissue 1975).
33. 193 Neb. at 111, 225 N.W.2d at 552. As the Annual Survey of Nebraska
Law, supra note 31, at 8, correctly stated:
The Nebraska Court relied heavily upon the standard set out
in Hansberry v. Lee to satisfy the due process requirement.
Quoting Hansberry, the court said:
Here, as elsewhere, the Fourteenth Amendment does
not compel state courts or legislatures to adopt any
particular rule for establishing the conclusiveness of
judgments in class suits ... nor does it compel the
adoption of the particular rules thought by the Court
to be appropriate for the federal courts. With a
proper regard for divergent local institutions and
interests ... this Court is justified in saying that
there has been a failure of due process only in those
cases where it cannot be said that the procedure
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests
of absent parties who are to be bound by it .... It
is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that mem-
bers of a class not present as parties to the litigation
may be bound by the judgment where they are in
fact adequately represented by parties who are pres-
ent, or where they actually participate in the conduct
of the litigation in which members of the class are
present as parties.
34. See Comment, The Class Representative: The Problem of the Absent
Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1133 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n.,
66 F.R.D. 581 (E.D. Pa. 1975); American Fin. System, Inc. v. Harlow,
65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1974); Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358
F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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tion, however, is what constitutes a conflict of interest. Courts
have different, even opposing, views of the degree of conflict
needed to preclude the class action.30 In Blankenship, the poten-
tial economic ramifications of winning on the merits was enough
of a conflict of interest to preclude the maintenance of the class
actionY
This type of potential economic conflict, which inheres in the
granting of monetary relief, is rarely considered. 38  Most courts
assume that the granting of damages, often on the massive scale
necessary in class actions, will accrue to the benefit of class mem-
bers. 39 Recently, however, there appears to be a slowly emerging
judicial awareness of the potential economic conflict analysis. 40
A. Consideration of Economics in State Courts
Most state courts have paid little attention to the potential
economic conflicts of interests within a class as a result of winning
on the merits of the lawsuit.41 In Luitweiler v. Northchester
36. Note, Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.-Preclusion of a
Class Action by Speculation, UTAH L. REV. 842, 844 (1974) (a discus-
sion of recent federal cases conflicting on this requirement).
37. In interpreting Evans the court stated:
As we read that case, its rule is that if any party included
in the class stands to suffer an economic loss as the result of
his inclusion, the party initiating the classification will "have
an interest adverse to those" of the party he purports to re-
present with the result the action is not being brought for
the benefit of all members of the class, and the claim as a
class suit must therefore fail.
195 Neb. at 175-76, 237 N.W.2d at 90.
38. Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical And Representative Plain-
tiff Under Subsections (a) (3) and (4) Of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 406, 418 (1973) (a comparison of cases finding the economics
irrelevant and others which follow the economic conflict analysis).
39. Note, supra note 38.
40. See Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 62 F.R.D. 43 (D. Utah
1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974) (class action was denied
because if plaintiffs prevailed on the action defendants would be
forced to charge actual freight rates which would place some members
of the class in a subordinate competitive position to other class mem-
bers-thus a conflict of interest existed). For discussion of this case
see Note, supra note 36. See also Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric
Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973)
(see discussion of case at notes 62-66 and accompanying texts infra);
Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated,
409 U.S. 815 (1972) (see discussion of case at notes 60-66 and accom-
panying texts infra); Group Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Barrett, 426 S.W.2d
310, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (radiologists' class action against Blue
Cross disallowed because some class members might object due to
the fact that if Blue Cross lost, the insurance rates might rise). Note,
supra note 39, advocates that the courts use this type of analysis.
41. See, e.g., Javor v. State Board of Equalization, 12 Cal. 3d 790, 527 P.2d
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Corp.,42 a class action was brought by a group of tenants against
their landlord because of a monthly surcharge imposed on tenants
who purchased their propane gas from someone other than the
landlord. The tenants sought recovery of past payments and an
injunction from future imposition of the surcharge. In holding the
class action maintainable the court stated that there were no ad-
verse interests within the class since all parties would benefit from
the relief sought.
4 3
In Luitweiler the court apparently assumed that the granting of
damages and the enjoining of future surcharges would be to the
benefit of the tenants. It did not consider the fact that winning on
the merits of the suit might cause the landlord to raise the rents
which in the long-run could outweigh the benefits of the suit to
some tenants.
In Miami Beach v. Jacobs,44 a class action was held to be
proper where the class members sought repayment for fees paid to
the city for connection to the water supply. The court did not
consider that the long-run economic effect of winning the lawsuit
might be an increase in taxes.
Likewise, in Rugalstad v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal As-
sociation4 5 a farmer brought a class action suit on behalf of all
farmers who had obtained advances from the elevator, alleging that
the interest rates were usurious. The court held that this was a
proper class action and that the representative party fairly and
adequately would protect the interests of the other class members.4 6
Again, the court like numerous others,4 7 did not consider the
long-run economic effect of winning the lawsuit in determining the
adequacy of representation.
If these courts had considered the economic standard set down
in Blankenship they probably would have come to different results.
1153, 117 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1974); State v. Dickinson, 305 S.2d 848 (Fla.
1975); Northview Constr. Co. v. St. Clair Shores, 395 Mich. 497, 236
N.W.2d 396 (1975), af'd on rehearing, - Mich. -, 249 N.W.2d 290
(1976); Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J. Super. 369, 287 A.2d 736
(1972); Scarborough v. Elmira Housing Authority, 78 Misc. 2d 885, 358
N.Y.S.2d 861 (1974); Mussullem v. Diners Club, Inc., 69 Wis. 2d 437,
230 N.W.2d 717 (1975). These cases did not even consider or discuss
the possible economic conflict of interest.
42. 456 Pa. 530, 319 A.2d 899 (1974).
43. Id. at 534, 319 A.2d at 902.
44. 315 So. 2d 227 (Fla. App. 1975).
45. 226 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1975).
46. Id. at 375.
47. See note 41 supra.
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However, none of these courts considered the long-run economic
effect of winning the lawsuit in determining the maintenance of the
class action. Each of them clearly found that there was adequate
representation and therefore that no conflict of interest existed.
The failure of these courts to consider the economic effect of
winning the lawsuit can indicate one of two conclusions: (1) the
courts failed to realize the potential economic conflict of interests
resulting from the winning of the lawsuit; or (2) the courts real-
ized the economic analysis but concluded that it was not a relevant
inquiry for determining the maintenance of the class action.
48  If
the latter conclusion is the correct interpretation of these decisions,
how can the Blankenship opinion be reconciled? One solution is
that the Nebraska Supreme Court has made a policy decision to be
especially protective of the interests of public utility companies. 49
Therefore this type of economic analysis will be confined to class
actions involving utility companies as defendants.
B. Federal Court Decisions Considering Economic Standard
State courts often have looked to federal decisions for guidance
in the class action area.50 The Nebraska Supreme Court in Blan-
kenship followed this practice. It stated that the policy underlying
its holding in Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities District,5 1 which
was the basis for the decision in Blankenship,52 appealed to
be the same as that underlying Rule 23 (a) (3) and (4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.53 Although there is some doubt
as to the precise meaning of the "typicality" requirement of 23
(a) (3) ,54 subsections (a) (3) and (4) generally have been con-
48. Note, supra note 38, also came to this conclusion when analyzing the
federal cases of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1968); and Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971). It con-
cluded that the reason the courts are reluctant to dismiss the case
on such grounds is because the class action procedure may be the only
vehicle by which substantive claims, individually too small to justify
judicial action, can be heard.
49. It is interesting to note that both Blankenship and Evans (the only
cases where this economic standard has been imposed) involved utility
companies being sued by their customers.
50. This is especially true with states that have passed class action statutes
similar to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
51. 185 Neb. 464, 176 N.W.2d 679 (1970). See note 5 for discussion of
the case supra.
52. See note 5 supra.
53. 195 Neb. at 177, 237 N.W.2d at 90.
54. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
For an analysis of the "typicality" requirement see Note, supra note
38.
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strued by the courts as incorporating the Hansberry prohibition of
class actions 55 where the interests of the class members are in
conflict. 56 Rule 23 (a) (3) and (4) provide that:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as represen-
tative parties on behalf of all only if . . . (3) the claims or de-
fenses are typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
57
Therefore these subsections are designed to guide a court in exer-
cising its duty to protect the absent class members who will be
bound by the judgment unless they opt out.58
It is one thing to state the representation prerequisites of Rule
23, but it is quite another to find consistent application of these
requirements. 59 The court in Blankenship seemed to rely heavily
on the Eight Circuit's application of the requirements in Ihrke v.
Northern States Power Co.60 In Ihrke the plaintiff brought a class
55. See notes 26 and 33 supra.
56. See, Note, supra note 36, at 844. E.g., City of Chicago v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th
Cir. 1972); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); William Goldman Theatres,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 35, 40 (C.D. Pa. 1969).
57. FD. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)-(4).
58. See Note, supra note 38, at 408. Subsection (c) (2) (B) of FED. R. CIV.
P. 23 specifies that all members of the class, whether present or not,
will be bound by the court judgment unless they request exclusion
in advance.
59. Compare Ihrke v. Northern Trust Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated,
409 U.S. 815 (1972), with Cottrell v. Virginia Electric Power Co., 62
F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Va. 1974).
60. 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). Another case
the court cited for its authority was Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338
F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972). In Gerlach the court held a class action
to be improper because if the plaintiff's allegation concerning All-
state's truth-in-lending violations were sustained, the damages would
render Allstate unable to meet its commitments to provide insurance.
Therefore the court denied the class action on the basis that the class
members, most of whom were policy holders, would prefer the policy
coverage rather than damages. Note, supra note 38, in discussing Ger-
lach, also points to other recent decisions determining class action sta-
tus by looking at the impact on the defendant. See, e.g., Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp. of DeKalb, 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
These cases are distinguishable from Ihrke and Blankenship, how-
ever, because in Ihrke and Blankenship the winning on the merits by
the plaintiff will not force defendant out of business. Therefore the
court is not faced with total annihilation of the defendant, just a possi-
ble increase in rates. Note, supra note 38, argues that this type of dis-
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action to compel the defendant power company to provide a hear-
ing before terminating service to its users. The court found that a
conflict of interest existed within the class and that this violated the
"typical" requirement of Rule 23 (a) (3). In coming to this
conclusion the court analyzed the plaintiff's possibility of success
and stated that:
It is highly unlikely that the claim of the Ihrkes that a hearing
should be required after notice and prior to termination, i- typical
of the claims of the class. It is likely that some customers of
Northern would feel that the additional expense of such a pro-
cedure, if it is indeed required, could conceivably result in a rate
increase to all customers, and this certainly would not be consid-
ered desirable by all of the subscribers of Northern.61
This type of analysis also was adopted in Lucas v. Wisconsin
Electric Power Co., 62 which involved a class action by customers
against the power company for terminating service without notice
upon nonpayment of the bill. Although no opinion was expressed
as to whether this was a proper class action, the court in citing
Ihrke declared that there was room to doubt whether all customers
would desire the due process procedures because of possible in-
creased rates.
3
The analysis and rationale of the Ihrke and Lucas opinions was
strongly criticized in Cottrell v. Virginia Electric Power Co.0 4 In
tinction should not be recognizdd. It asserts that the court should con-
sider the economic effect in either case.
61. 459 F.2d at 572. Judge Lay in his concurring opinion disagreed with
the court on the maintenance of the class action:
It seems to me that the claim brought here by the plaintiff
is one that affects all subscribers to utility services and one
in which all subscribers to utility services have a direct inter-
est, to-wit, adequate notice prior to termination of the utility
service. I deem this is sufficient interest under Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 23 to allow plaintiff to sue as a representative
of the class.
Id. at 573.
62. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
63. Id. at 644. Justice Spreecher's dissent, which Chief Justice Swygert
joined, stated:
Finally, I believe that this is a proper class action . . . since
its possible effect on public utility rates is purely incidental
to the constitutional issues involved.
Id. at 672.
In the appellants' brief in Blankenship this type of argument was
made to the court.
Adverse interest sufficient to defeat the claim of "identity of
interests" have to be based on some legal interest as being
urged for recognition in the court. It certainly has to be more
than a mere economic consequence.
Brief for Appellants at 10 (emphasis added). However, the argument
must have fallen on deaf ears.
64. 62 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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Cottrell a group of residential customers brought a class action
against the electric company to compel an opportunity to be heard
before termination of services. In holding the suit a proper class
action, the court stated:
Typicalness is not a subjective test, authorizing a judge to dismiss
a class action based on a substantial legal claim where he thinks
some members of the class may prefer to leave the violation of
their rights unremedied. 65 But it was exactly this erroneous in-
terpretation of the term that was applied in Ihrke v. Northern
Power Co.. . . and Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co ... .66
This type of subjective analysis was used by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in denying class action status for the customers of Omaha
Public Power District. The court determined that certain members
of the class would prefer to pay the possible usurious rates rather
than correct the violation of their rights.
This type of subjective analysis by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has evolved out of the court's decision in Gant v. City of
Lincoln."7 Because individual notice of the action is not given to all
class members, the Nebraska Supreme Court now is required to
substitute its subjective determination of the interests of the absent
class members for the determination by the individual parties of
their interests. 68  However, the court's subjective determination
that some people would prefer to sit on their rights rather than
enforce them because of the long-run economic effect of enforce-
ment, is not the type of consideration a court should use to deny
class action status. As one commentator correctly stated, this type
of reasoning
is totally foreign to the theory of conflict of interests espoused by
other courts and scholars. On this logic, it is difficult to visualize
any class action that could be maintained, since it is always possi-
ble that there will be some mugwomps who would rather sit on
their wrongs then fight to correct them.69
Moreover, the interest which the court is seeking to protect in
Blankenship is the absent members' interests in maintaining a
possible illegal rate because it might be cheaper for them in the
long-run. In an analogous opinion, however, the declaring of a
65. 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23-327 (1976).
66. 62 F.R.D. at 520.
67. 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975). See notes 29-33 supra.
68. It might have been easier for the Nebraska Supreme Court to have
required individual notice to everyone rather than subjectively deter-
mine each absent party's interest.
69. Starrs, supra note 1, at 501. This comment was made in reference
to Group Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Barrett, 426 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
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conflict of interest within the class based on some members' possible
interest in maintaining an illegal law was struck down. 70
In Watson v. Branch County Bank,71 a class action was
brought challenging the constitutionality of the repossession provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The defendant asserted
that this was not a proper class action due to a conflict of interest
within the class. It contended that if these provisions were de-
clared unconstitutional, the cost of credit would be increased to all
members of the plaintiff's class and some members would not be
able to secure any credit. This, it was contended, would be con-
trary to the "interests" of the plaintiff's class, and especially con-
trary to the interests of those who could no longer obtain credit.
After pointing out that Rule 23 (a) (4) directs the court to
take particular care that absent plaintiffs' legally protectable inter-
ests are not lost unfairly or compromised through the class action72
the court stated:
If these repossession statutes are unconstitutional neither the
named plaintiffs, nor others similarily situated nor the defendants
have any legally protectable interest in maintaining it, or at least
such interest that would render this suit inappropriate as a class
action.73
If the late payment charges in Blankenship were usurious, the
absent class members had no legally protectable interest in preserv-
ing the illegal rates.74 By denying class action status in Blanken-
ship, the Nebraska Supreme Court protected the absent class mem-
bers' interests in continuing the usurious rate. It is hard to
rationalize the court's declaration of a conflict of interest by pro-
tecting an illegal interest. These types of interests are not ones that
should render a suit inappropriate as a class action due to a conflict
of interest between class members.
C. Application of the Economic Standard
The economic standard which the Nebraska Supreme Court
70. Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 955.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. The court in Blankenship did not say that there was only a conflict
in the relief sought by the plaintiffs, such as between damages or in-
junction, but that some members wanted no relief at all. For analysis
on conflicts in relief sought see Comment, The Class Representative:
The Problem of The Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1133 (1974).
The court held that both the damages sought and the injunction cre-
ated a conflict of interest.
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laid down in Blankenship is unworkable for a plaintiff seeking to
bring a class action. In order to be certain that no conflict of
interest exists, the representative party will have to weigh the
individual long-run economic effect of winning the lawsuit for each
prospective class member and then determine the class accordingly.
Few plaintiffs seeking to represent a class will be able to show
that there are no potential long-run economic conflicts of interests
among any of the hundreds or even thousands of class members. 75
This type of individual consideration by the representative party
to decide who will desire to enforce his rights should not be
required.
While reasons might exist in individual cases which would lead
to a desire to waive a right rather than bear proportionally the
cost of its provision, absent evidence as to individual decisions, the
presumptions must go against waiver. Thus plaintiffs need not af-
firmatively prove an individual calculus on the part of each class
member that leads him to reject waiver. The showing that the
court's decision will have the same practical effect on all members,
i.e., each will pay any, marginal cost increase . . . is sufficient to
satisfy plaintiffs' initial burden. 6
V. CONCLUSION
In view of the Nebraska Supreme Court's recent decision in
Gant v. City of Lincoln,77 which gave a boost to plaintiffs seeking
to bring class actions in the state courts, it is hard to rationalize the
Blankenship opinion. One possible theory is that because the
Gant decision dispensed with individual notice to all class members
the court bent over backwards to assure that the legal rights of
absent parties were not jeopardized. With this rationalization,
however, it is hard to understand how the absent class members
could have a legal right in preserving an illegal rate.78 A second
theory is that this economic standard is to be confined to the facts
of Blankenship. 9 The court in its opinion, however, did not
evidence this as its intent.
In either case, the class action procedure for plaintiffs was
severely curtailed in Blankenship. If this long-run economic loss
standard is to be applied broadly in the future it will be hard to
visualize any class action that can be maintained when the plaintiff
is suing someone with whom he will be dealing in the future.8 0
75. See Note, supra note 36, at 850.
76. 62 F.R.D. at 522.
77. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
79. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
80. When the plaintiff brings a suit against someone he will be dealing
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Therefore, although there is some case law supporting this eco-
nomic analysis, the better approach is that the long-run economic
effect of the lawsuit is irrelevant for determining the existence of a
conflict of interest between the representative party and the other
class members.
Bradley D. Holtorf '77
with in the future there is always the possibility that the cost of the
suit to the defendant will be passed on through increased prices for
goods or services. Thus, under the court's long-run economic stand-
ard, the benefits of the lawsuit could be reduced to the plaintiffs and
there is a possibility that some plaintiffs in the long-run could be at
an economic loss as a result of the suit.
